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The resource curse
The literature on economic development 
categorises mining as one of a set of 
resource-intensive extractive activities 
that present problems both for 
macroeconomic management and for 
governmental integrity. The general term 
for these issues is the ‘resource curse’. 
Empirically, the ‘curse’ is a negative 
observed relationship between reliance on 
natural-resource exports and economic 
growth performance: countries which 
rely heavily on resources-based exports 
grow more slowly than the average (Van 
Wijnbergen, 1984; Sachs and Warner, 2001; 
Gylfason et al., 1999). Probably the best-
known example is the deindustrialisation 
in the Netherlands and then the United 
Kingdom that followed large-scale 
discovery and exploitation of North Sea 
oil and gas, and which became known as 
‘Dutch disease’ (Economist, 1977).
Three Australian economists led the 
economic theory of the resource curse: 
Bob Gregory, Max Corden and Peter Neary 
(Gregory, 1976; Corden, 1983; Corden and 
Neary, 1982; Neary and Van Wijnbergen, 
1985). In their analysis, a minerals boom 
would tend to drive up the real exchange 
rate, thereby squeezing the profitability 
of other tradable-goods producers and 
producing a lopsided economic structure 
in which industrial production for the 
home market tended to atrophy. In 
so far as manufacturing contributes 
more to technological dynamism than 
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Like most productive activities, mining contributes to 
human welfare. Also like most economic activities, mining 
is best done where the relevant resources are relatively 
abundant and where economic costs (in the widest sense) 
are lowest. Mining will not increase economic welfare – on 
the contrary, it will often reduce it – if done in the wrong 
place, or in the wrong way, or without a proper legal and 
regulatory framework. Mining therefore presents industry-
specific problems for regulators and policy makers, which 
cannot be finessed by overgeneralised rhetoric or glamorous 
photography. This paper reviews some of the key policy 
issues to be borne in mind in the ongoing debate over the 
expansion of mining activity in New Zealand’s conservation 
estate, and summarises the results of some recent statistical 
research on the economics of mining in New Zealand.
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primary commodity production, the 
restructuring would tend to slow down 
the economy’s growth.
More recently, economists have 
focused on a second way in which 
minerals booms damage growth: via 
erosion of an economy’s regulatory 
and policy-making capability due to 
the ability of large mining companies 
to fund intensive lobbying for special 
favours, a process known as ‘rent-
seeking’ (Bulte, Damania and Deacon, 
2005; Mehlum, Moene and Torvik, 2006; 
Robinson, Torvik and Verdier, 2006). 
When successful, rent-seeking produces 
distorted policy regimes which reward 
the lobbying interests at the expense 
of the rest of the economy, potentially 
doing more damage to the growth of 
small and medium enterprises in sectors 
that are unable or unwilling to pour 
scarce resources into countervailing 
political lobbying to re-level the playing 
field.
The resource curse is now a staple 
of the economic development literature. 
The conclusion from four decades of 
research on the topic is that there are 
real negative spillovers from resource-
based industries into other tradable 
goods sectors, and that careful policy 
management is required to secure growth 
on the basis of resources-based exports 
(Gylfason, 2001). Policy makers need 
to tread carefully, and the wider public 
needs to be sure that the nation’s policy-
making and regulatory institutions are 
not captured and distorted by industry 
rent-seeking.
In New Zealand, mining has 
generally been too small a part of the 
economy to make the resource curse a 
serious macroeconomic issue. General-
equilibrium economics always expects 
some crowding-out of non-mineral 
tradables by large mining developments 
via real exchange-rate appreciation 
(for a recent example, see table 3 in 
Layton, et al., 2010, p.23), but the deeper 
economic policy questions here relate 
to more diffuse negative spillovers from 
mining or other large-scale resources-
based development, such as damage to 
the national branding of pastoral and 
tourism exports, loss of the existence 
and option values of natural landscapes 
and ecosystems, and the potential for 
regulatory capture by large mining 
interests. 
Balancing competing values
Over the period 1978–1984 there was 
intense public debate over a raft of large 
resource-based projects promoted under 
the slogan ‘Think Big’. Several of these 
projects were driven by the government’s 
wish to make early use of the recently-
discovered and very large Maui gas 
field. It remains unclear how much of 
the political momentum derived from 
large-industry lobbying and how much 
from the desire of ministers to burnish 
their ‘development’ credentials, but 
the outcome was a series of legislative 
and regulatory decisions1 that heavily 
discounted environmental and other 
non-market impacts of the projects 
and provided substantial underwrites 
for high-risk large industrial ventures, 
several of which turned out badly at high 
cost to taxpayers.
Following the 1984 change of 
government, a number of lessons from 
the Think Big experiences were applied 
to institutional design in the areas 
of planning law and environmental 
protection. One outcome was the 
Resource Management Act 1991 
(regularly targeted by various large 
‘developer’ vested interests as an undue 
obstacle to their commercial projects). 
Another was the Conservation Act 1987, 
which set aside large areas of Crown 
lands, most of them formerly controlled 
by the New Zealand Forest Service, to be 
administered by the newly-established 
Department of Conservation for the 
primary purpose of conservation. Only 
non-consumptive activities – recreation 
and (appropriate) tourism – were to be 
‘fostered’ (s6e) by the department; all 
other commercial activities (except for 
mining) had to secure a ‘concession’ 
from the minister of conservation, 
who was to weigh up a number of 
potentially competing values, amongst 
which conservation values were to 
predominate, before granting permission 
(s17, especially 17Q and 17U).
Mining was from the outset an 
anomaly, because mining companies’ 
access to Crown lands was granted by a 
different minister under the old Mining 
Act. Mining activities were explicitly 
exempted from the Conservation Act 
under section 17O(3), and this separate 
status was translated into a special 
‘access’ arrangement under section 61 of 
the Crown Minerals Act (which replaced 
the Mining Act in 1991). ‘Access’ required 
a project to pass a much less demanding 
set of tests than those faced by non-
mining projects under the Conservation 
Act, leaving the conservation estate 
less protected from mining than from 
other commercial development. Hence 
the current debate over the extent to 
which mining ought to proceed on 
conservation lands.
New Zealanders are generally 
relaxed about mining activity that 
extracts obviously useful things for the 
general good. Quarrying, for example, 
is the dominant open-cut mining 
activity around the country, and 
supplies essential inputs to roading and 
construction. Most places have a quarry 
in the vicinity. Most of the mining 
consents in the conservation estate have 
been for quarrying, and most of those 
have been uncontroversial.  
‘Access’ required a project to pass a much less 
demanding set of tests than those faced by non-
mining projects under the Conservation Act, leaving 
the conservation estate less protected from mining 
than from other commercial development. 
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In considering whether particular 
types of mining ought to proceed in 
particular conservation areas, therefore, 
the issue is not whether the mining 
sector in general should be encouraged 
or discouraged. The problem is to 
adjudicate among competing values, 
including non-market, and often non-
quantifiable, ones. This brings us to 
social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA), 
the economist’s way of systematically 
thinking through the full implications of 
a project, taking account of all relevant 
costs and benefits, both quantifiable and 
unquantifiable.
Done properly, SCBA provides an 
antidote to two common pathologies 
that afflict policy making: the temptation 
to look only at benefits and ignore costs 
(under constant pressure from vested-
interest lobbyists seeking to ‘boost’ 
their pet projects),2 and the temptation 
to focus on quantifiables while putting 
non-quantifiables into the ‘too hard’ 
basket.
In an ideal world, of course, 
everything would be quantifiable. 
The regulator or analyst would have 
available full valuations of things like 
existence value, option value, national 
brand value, recreational and aesthetic 
values, and so on. In practice, a large 
component of informed judgment is 
required about qualitative issues and 
non-marketed values. Economists have 
to be keenly aware of the point at which 
their professional expertise runs out 
and judgment from mandated decision 
makers is required.
One important way in which non-
quantifiables can be efficiently and 
appropriately given their due weight 
is the classification of a country’s land 
area according to the importance of 
conservation values in each area, with 
a correspondingly ascending scale of 
degrees of protection from mining and 
other activities that deplete conservation 
values. The establishment of schedule 
4 of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 by 
amendment in 1997 is a case in point. 
Schedule 4 is best seen as a device to 
reduce regulatory uncertainty, and 
avoid the waste of scarce resources on 
complex consenting and cost-benefit 
processes, by the simple transaction-
cost-minimising device of removing 
the highest-value categories of land 
from consideration for mining. Its 
effectiveness in performing that role, 
unfortunately, relies on the credibility 
of the protection afforded. Regulatory 
uncertainty, and its potentially chilling 
effect on investment in general, is only 
increased when industry lobbies see real 
opportunities to overturn institutions 
and rules rather than to work within 
them. This has turned out to be the 
case with schedule 4 because of the 
weakness of the protection provided by 
the legislation, which gives two ministers 
unfettered discretion to remove areas 
from the schedule by order in council, 
following a consultation process that 
might easily be reduced to tokenism. An 
important lesson from the 2010 debates 
is that, at the very least, removal of 
schedule 4 protection from any piece of 
land ought to require a parliamentary 
vote, and the Crown Minerals Act ought 
to be amended accordingly.
While the sort of absolute prohibition 
on mining provided by schedule 4 is 
appropriate for the very highest-value 
categories of conservation land, there 
is also scope for a clearly-defined filter 
to be applied to any project proposed in 
lower-valued areas of the conservation 
estate, prior to setting in motion the RMA 
machinery and detailed cost-benefit 
assessments. Such a filter is provided for 
non-mining activities by s17U(3) of the 
Conservation Act 1987, which prevents 
the minister of conservation from 
granting any application for a concession 
that is ‘contrary to the … purposes 
for which the land concerned is held’. 
This preliminary filter, which requires 
in effect that only projects that do not 
encroach unduly on key conservation 
values can proceed, ought to apply also 
to any mining project proposed for any 
part of the conservation estate. Ideally 
this would be achieved by repeal of 
s17O(3) of the Conservation Act (which 
exempts mining from the standard test 
applied to all other sectors except non-
consumptive tourism and recreation). 
Miners would then have to apply for 
concessions on the same footing as other 
sectors.  Once a project has been declared 
to be consistent with the reasonable 
protection of non-quantifiable values, 
the quantifiable elements of cost-benefit 
analysis would come into their own.
Bearing that in mind, in the 
remainder of this article I shall quickly 
review some areas in which back-of-
envelope quantitative calculation may 
provide some useful insights into the 
role that mining projects could be 
expected to play in the New Zealand 
economy. I focus on mining sectors 
other than oil and gas, since it is these 
that are most relevant when looking at 
the conservation estate. 
What are schedule 4 minerals actually 
worth?
One straightforward cost-benefit 
shortcut is a threshold test: using 
whatever quantitative data are available, 
estimate the cash price that a mining 
developer might offer for the resource 
and ask whether this would compensate 
adequately for the sacrifice of whatever 
non-market and unquantified values may 
be at risk. If the price seems reasonable 
in the eyes of whatever constituency 
determines the outcome, then the project 
could proceed; if not, not. This is not a 
full cost-benefit appraisal, simply a 
screening device. 
Schedule 4 is best seen as a device to reduce 
regulatory uncertainty, and avoid the waste of  
scarce resources on complex consenting and  
cost-benefit processes ... 
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I argue that something of this sort 
happened implicitly in the course of 
2010. The government (1) published its 
proposal for mining to be allowed in 
schedule 4 lands, (2) put out some (very 
limited) information on the extent of 
mineral deposits in those lands (Ministry 
of Economic Development, 2010), (3) 
invited public submissions, and then 
(4) in the end withdrew the proposal in 
the face of a storm of public criticism. 
In so far as public opinion was correctly 
represented by the protests, submissions 
and final decision, it boiled down to 
a general feeling that the losses would 
outweigh the gains, on the limited 
information available.
The only actual dollar number 
provided in the government’s discussion 
document was a figure of $194 billion, 
described as ‘an estimate of the value 
of New Zealand’s on-shore minerals, 
excluding hydro-carbons’ (ibid., p.2). 
From an economist’s point of view this 
figure is in no sense the value of the 
resource; it is simply an estimate of 
gross revenue from its full extraction. 
Elementary economics requires the 
subtraction of the relevant costs (of 
exploration, development, extraction, 
processing, marketing, transportation, 
site rehabilitation and so on) to arrive 
at an estimate of the net income that the 
resource could yield – the sum generally 
referred to as ‘resource rent’. This is the 
return that the New Zealand public, as 
owners of subsoil minerals (through the 
Crown), could secure from a perfectly-
designed royalty on mining operations.3 
In present-valued form it is the lump sum 
that the country could expect to receive 
by selling off, to the highest bidder, the 
unlimited right to mine all on-shore 
non-oil minerals.
In 2002 and 2003 Statistics New 
Zealand released estimates of this 
rental value of New Zealand’s mineral 
estate (Statistics New Zealand, 2002, 
2003, table 5.1, p.16), using essentially 
the same physical inventory of 
mineral deposits as the 2010 Ministry 
of Economic Development (MED) 
discussion document on schedule 4. The 
estimates showed very great sensitivity to 
commodity price movements (see Figure 
1),4 but the order of magnitude is clear: 
less than a $2 billion lump-sum valuation 
for the entire mineral estate, which 
means resource rentals run below 1% of 
the MED’s gross sales revenue figure.
The mineral reserves listed in the 
parts of schedule 4 covered by the MED’s 
March 2010 stocktake were 10% of the 
New Zealand total, implying that in total 
they would sell for substantially less than 
$200 million. With 2.8 million voters, 
that converts to a price for sacrificing 
the highest-valued corners of the 
conservation estate consisting of a one-
off payment of less than $70 per voter. 
If the rough mid-point value in Figure 
1 is used – $1 billion – the price offered 
per voter would be $35. If all of schedule 
4 were opened up without restriction to 
mining, the mining rights to this 40% of 
New Zealand’s total minerals endowment 
would fetch $400 million, or $143 per 
voter. The public’s instinctive estimation 
of the balance of costs and benefits, and 
rejection of the March 2010 proposals, 
looks well-founded.
Income distribution and employment vary 
widely by detailed sector
One important piece of quantitative 
information that was missing from the 
official information during the 2010 
debates is the extent to which different 
types of mining have different economic 
structures, and hence different impacts 
on the wider economy. The national 
accounts show only highly-aggregated 
figures for all mining lumped together, 
and Statistics New Zealand does not 
produce disaggregated figures on grounds 
of ‘commercial confidentiality’. The effect 
of this secrecy is to conceal information 
that would be essential for proper public 
scrutiny of mining policy. Gold and 
silver mining, central to the 2010 debates, 
represents only 20% of the value of output 
in the mining and quarrying sector, even 
with oil and gas excluded. The dominant 
non-petroleum mine products are coal 
(40%) and quarry products such as 
gravel, rock and sand (35%). Quarrying 
and coal mining are predominantly New 
Zealand-owned, and quarrying incudes 
a large number of small- and medium-
scale operations accounting for much 
of the sector’s employment. Hiding gold 
and silver behind those other activities in 
the statistics is a disservice to good policy 
making.
Fortunately, there is enough 
information scattered around the public 
arena to enable estimated accounts to be 
constructed for five mining subsectors: 
quarrying, coal, ironsands, gold and silver, 
and services to mining. (My accounts for 
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the last of these contain residual entries 
to reconcile with the aggregated national 
accounts, hence are particularly subject 
to errors and omissions and are excluded 
from Figures 2 and 3.)
Figures 2 and 3 set out the results of this 
exercise, showing the breakdowns of gross 
output and gross value added amongst 
the various distributional categories.5 
The bars are presented at successively 
greater levels of disaggregation. On the 
left of both charts is a bar for the New 
Zealand economy overall; then a bar for 
all mining combined (including oil and 
gas). Then the aggregate mining sector 
is divided between oil and gas and other 
mining. Finally, the disaggregation of 
other mining is carried through to ANSIC 
level 3.
The differences are significant. For 
both the New Zealand economy and 
mining as a whole, gross value added 
(the part of output not taken up by 
payments for intermediate purchases) 
was about 45% of output; lower for coal 
and quarrying, higher for oil and gas and 
gold and silver. Of the gross value added, 
depreciation (really a form of intermediate 
purchase, since it represents consumption 
of fixed capital, not a return to capital) 
took 15% of gross value added for the 
economy as a whole compared with 26% 
for mining, but within mining there was 
a dramatic range, from 4% for ironsands 
to 45% for gold and silver. Net operating 
surplus (profit and rent going to the 
owners of the businesses) was one-third 
of gross value added for the economy as 
a whole compared with 48% for mining; 
within mining, the share ranged from 
31% for gold and silver to 50% for oil and 
gas. These figures highlight the capital-
intensive nature of mining in general and 
gold and silver mining in particular. 
The very high depreciation share 
in gold and silver implies low company 
income tax, given the generous tax 
deductions provided to mining; sure 
enough, income taxes and royalties 
combined were only 4.4% of total output 
and 8.3% of value added for gold and 
silver mining in 2007, about 25% of net 
operating surplus. The only mining 
sector with lower tax payments than 
precious metals was ironsands, where 
tax losses carried forward from previous 
years meant no company tax was paid 
at all, and royalties took a mere 0.1% of 
gross output value.
The high capital share of income 
and low effective tax rates translate to 
high rates of leakage of income from 
the New Zealand economy, given the 
almost complete offshore ownership of 
ironsands and gold and silver mining, 
and substantial overseas ownership in oil 
and gas. Figure 4 indicates that overseas 
ownership accounts for 35–40% of the 
mining sector’s net capital stock (the 
remarkably high 2003 and 2004 figures 
are almost certainly an error by Statistics 
New Zealand).
The counterpart to high capital 
shares of income is a low wage and 
salary share in key mining sectors. Across 
the New Zealand economy as a whole, 
compensation of employees claims 47% 
of value added, whereas for mining as a 
whole the wage share is 21% – less than 
half. Again, there are wide variations. 
Ironsands in my estimated accounts has a 
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Figure 2: Distribution of Gross Output by Detailed Mining Sector, 
2007
Figure 3: Distribution of Gross Value Added by Detailed Mining  
Sector, 2007
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wage share of about 57%; quarrying and 
coal has 35%, gold and silver 21% and oil 
and gas 13%. The sector as a whole is not 
a strong employment or wage-income 
generator, and of the non-oil mining 
activities gold and silver are clearly the 
weakest on this score. This is consistent 
with the observation that mining as 
a whole accounts for roughly 1% of 
GDP but only 0.3% of the economy’s 
employment. Also unsurprising is that 
coal mining and quarrying between them 
account for over two-thirds of the mining 
sector’s total employment. 
Foreign exchange contribution
A question often asked when assessing 
the economic contribution a sector’s 
expansion could make is how much it 
contributes to the nation’s balance of 
payments. There are two elements in this. 
First is the net foreign-exchange impact of 
direct receipts (from export earnings) and 
payments (for imported intermediates, 
depreciation of foreign-owned capital and 
profit accruing offshore). This calculation 
yields, for 2007, the grey bars in Figure 
5. Second is the overall contribution, 
including import savings (the amount 
that would have had to be paid to import 
the mining products supplied to the local 
economy if the domestic mining sector 
were not here). This direct and indirect 
total impact is shown in the dark blue 
on the right in Figure 5. The outstanding 
contributor is quarrying, because of the 
very high transport costs per tonne that 
would have to be paid to import the 
gravel, stone and sand supplied to local 
construction, cement manufacture and 
roading. The least strong contributor is 
gold and silver, with a direct contribution 
of 49% of gross sales revenue and a direct 
and indirect combined impact of 55%.6 
Contingent liabilities
The direct environmental damage caused 
by mining – especially via open-cut pits 
and large tailings dams – often has to be 
remedied by expensive engineering work 
after mining ceases, and it is only recently 
that these contingent liabilities have been 
taken seriously by New Zealand policy 
makers (prior to the 1991 mining legisla-
tion, mining companies could simply walk 
away, leaving their sites as orphans to be 
cleaned up at taxpayer expense). It is now 
customary for cash bonds to be required as 
part of the RMA process, but the amounts 
of the bonds remain insufficient to cover 
all contingent liabilities, which means 
heavy reliance is placed on the goodwill of 
companies to remedy major damage on 
their own account. Of four major mines 
in the Hauraki-Coromandel area since the 
1960s, two (Tui and Golden Cross) have 
had tailings containment failures and one 
(Martha Hill) had subsidence, damaging 
properties in the township. The Tui clean-
up will cost taxpayers over $20 million. 
Golden Cross tailings-dam remediation 
cost the owners somewhere between $30 
and $60 million. Non-compliance with 
RMA consent conditions, especially in 
Figure 4: Overseas Investment in Mining Compared with Mining Net Capital Stock
Figure 5: Direct and Indirect Foreign Exchange Contribution as % of Gross Output
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relation to waterways pollution, is still a 
recurrent feature of the industry, especially 
on the West Coast. Combined with the 
boom-and-bust cycle of world prices for 
mining outputs, this means that mining 
is a relatively high-risk activity and this 
needs to be factored in to any cost-benefit 
assessments of mining projects.
Spillovers
Spillovers (externalities) from mining 
in the conservation estate come in two 
sets. The most obvious are the largely 
unquantifiable detriments to the existence 
values of landscapes and ecosystems, which 
impact negatively on non-consumptive 
uses such as recreation, tourism, 
photography and film, and the vicarious 
enjoyment of the New Zealand outdoor 
environment by people who may never 
visit the relevant places in person. Existence 
values are no less real than commercial 
values, and it is not helpful to dismiss 
them as ‘emotion’, since human welfare 
is ultimately experienced as happiness by 
individuals and it is this that economics 
seeks to maximise. Given the difficulties 
of quantification, the provisions of the 
Conservation Act discussed earlier and 
the existence of schedule 4 of the Crown 
Minerals Act provide a reasonably effective 
way of ensuring that these spillovers are 
accounted for in policy decisions.
The second set of spillovers are more 
susceptible of quantification: negative 
impacts on other sectors of the economy 
due to factors such as damage to the 
nation’s brand image as ‘clean and green’ 
or ‘100% pure’. Two major studies in 
the early 2000s analysed the economic 
impact of a major negative shock to New 
Zealand’s brand image and estimated 
that environmental degradation, or 
policies perceived as anti-environment, 
could reduce overseas tourism by a large 
amount (over half in one study, rather 
less in the other) (PA Consulting Group, 
2001; Sanderson et al., 2003). Because 
of tourism’s large weight in GDP, the 
negative GDP impact of a loss of brand 
image could easily be 1–2%. This would 
be a big spillover effect.
Whether any particular mining project 
would have an impact of this sort on the 
national branding is highly uncertain. 
Some might, many probably would not. 
Recognition of the possibility, however, 
emphasises the need for policy on mining 
development to be framed, and suitable 
for presentation, in ‘clean–green’ brand-
friendly terms. The body language of 
government ministers in early 2010, 
with muscular statements criticising 
the restrictions imposed by existing 
environmental law, were ill-judged from 
this point of view. 
1 Notable examples were the National Development Act 1979 
and the Clutha Development (Clyde Dam) Empowering Act 
1982.
2 A good example of ‘boosterism’ by mining industry 
consultants is Layton et al. (2010), which traces the 
positive economy-wide effects of two hypothesised windfall 
mineral projects, both of which were simply assumed 
(with the assumptions left implicit, not explicit) to incur no 
environmental or other non-marketed costs, and to spring 
into being without any market incentives being required to 
trigger the required investments. 
3 Proposals in Australia to impose a resource rental tax on 
large mining companies represent a step towards such 
a well-designed royalty regime, and recognition that the 
prevailing tax system in that country has failed effectively 
to capture mining resource rents. For the Henry Tax Review 
discussion of the issues see http://taxreview.treasury.gov.au/
content/Content.aspx?doc=html/pubs_reports.htm, part 2, 
volume 1, chapter C.
4 For each year in Figure 1 the asset value of the mineral 
estate at 31 March is estimated, using the mineral 
commodity prices prevailing at that time. Year-to-year 
changes in the valuation are driven almost entirely by price 
changes, with a very minor role for actual discoveries and 
depletion during the preceding year.
5 I am grateful to Forest & Bird, for whom the research was 
undertaken, for permission to reproduce these charts. For the 
full dataset and accounts see Bertram (2010).
6 The minister of energy, Gerry Brownlee, in July 2010 
used on TV3 a figure of 91% for the balance-of-payments 
contribution of gold and silver mining. In response to a 
parliamentary question asking the minister for his source, 
his reply, on 11 August 2010, was that ‘According to www.
anotherview.co.nz Newmont Waihi Gold’s mining operations 
in 2009 generated a total revenue of $193.7M, 91% of 
which the website advises remained in New Zealand’. The 
news item cited on the website was Chris Rennie, ‘Overseas 
firms spend big in New Zealand’, Press, 26 May 2010. On 
inspection, it turned out that the article had (1) credited all 
intermediate purchases as local expenditure (overlooking 
the import content of intermediate purchases), (2) treated 
depreciation as a payment within New Zealand, and (3) 
treated all profits not immediately distributed as dividends 
as having been spent within New Zealand. The extent of 
repeated government reliance on unreliable figures from non-
official sources has been probably the most alarming element 
in the 2010 public debates.
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